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Abstract
Consider the problem of partitioning n items among d players where the utility of each player for bundles of items is additive; so,
player r has utility vir for item i and the utility of that player for a bundle of items is the sum of the vri ’s over the items i in his/her
bundle. Each partition S of the items is then associated with a d-dimensional utility vector V S whose coordinates are the utilities
that the players assign to the bundles they get under S. Also, lotteries over partitions are associated with the corresponding expected
utility vectors. We model the problem as a Nash bargaining game over the set of lotteries over partitions and provide methods for
computing the corresponding Nash solution, to prescribed accuracy, with effort that is polynomial in n. In particular, we show that
points in the pareto-optimal set of the corresponding bargaining set correspond to lotteries over partitions under which each item,
with the possible exception of at most d(d − 1)/2 items, is assigned in the same way.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The partition bargaining problem concerns a model where n items are to be partitioned among d players. Each
player associates a (positive) utility with the possession of each item, and the total utility of a player for a bundle of
items is additive, namely, it equals the sum of his/her utilities over the items in the bundle. A partition S of the items
is then associated with a d-dimensional utility vector whose coordinates are the players’ utilities for the bundles they
get under S. The set of utility vectors associated with partitions is a ﬁnite set in Rd and its convex hull is the set of
(expected utility) vectors corresponding to lotteries over partitions; we refer to the latter as the partition bargaining
polytope.
Our approach is to formulate the partition bargaining problem as a Nash bargaining game, where the partition
bargaining polytope is the set of expected utility outcomes and the origin is the disagreement point. The Nash solution
is then the (unique) maximizer of the product function (x) = ∏di=1xi over the partition bargaining polytope, or
equivalently, over the Pareto-optimal surface of that polytope. Nash [7] demonstrated that the use of the Nash solution
has appealing properties (in fact, it is the only method that has those properties). Other solution approaches have been
used, all of which select a point on the corresponding Pareto-optimal surface (e.g., [11]).
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The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we study properties of lotteries over partitions where the corresponding
(expected utility) vectors lie in the Pareto-optimal surface of the partition bargaining polytope. In particular, we show
that the assignment of “most” items under such lotteries is deterministic, that is, partitions with positive probability
under each such lottery are similar as they assign “most” items to the same player, respectively. Second, we develop
efﬁcient (that is, polynomial-time) computational methods for approximating, to prescribed accuracy, the Nash solution
of the Nash bargaining game corresponding to our partition bargaining problem. Of course, the number of possible
partitions of the n items to the d players is dn, implying that the maximization of the product function over all partitions
by enumeration is intractable even for moderate values of n (say n = 20 when d = 5). Also, when maximizing the
product function over the partition bargaining polytope, the optimal point does not have to correspond to a partition
(that is, to a degenerate lottery over partitions). Our approach is to enumerate efﬁciently ﬁnite sets of partitions where
the convex hulls of the associated utility vectors of these sets cover the Pareto-optimal surface. In particular, we show
how to efﬁciently generate all partitions whose utility vector is in the Pareto-optimal surface. Our analysis extends
results of Granot and Rothblum [4] which considered the partition bargaining problem with only two players (the case
d = 2).
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the formal model, and in Section 3 we survey
some preliminaries that we use. In Section 4 we demonstrate that points in the Pareto-optimal surface of the partition
bargaining polytope are representable by lotteries over partitions with limited randomization, that is, with most items
being assigned deterministically. In Section 5 we show how the Pareto-optimal surface can be covered by convex hulls
of sets of at most d-vectors which are associated with “similar” partitions. Next, in Sections 6 and 7 we show how to
enumerate efﬁciently partitions with utility vectors that are, respectively, Pareto-optimal/vertices. Next, in Section 8,
we use the results of Sections 5–7 to obtain efﬁcient methods for the (approximate) computation of the Nash solution
of partition bargaining games by decomposing the problem into polynomially many maximization problems of the
product function over “small sets”. Finally, Section 9 we discuss the results we obtain and some potential extensions.
2. The formal model
In this section, we formally introduce the model we analyze in this paper. The data consists of integers d2 and n1
and positive real numbers vir for each i = 1, . . . , n and r = 1, . . . , d. The sets {1, . . . , d} and {1, . . . , n} are denoted D
and N and we refer to their elements as agents (players) and items, respectively. Also, for i ∈ N and r ∈ D, we refer
to vir as the utility player r associates with item i. The utility vector associated with an item i ∈ N is deﬁned by
vi = (vi1 . . . , vid)T ∈ Rd . (2.1)
Items are to be partitioned among the players where the utility V Srr player r associates with bundle Sr ⊆ N is
additive, that is,
V S
r
r =
∑
i∈Sr
vir . (2.2)
We consider partitions of the items to the d players, where no item is left without allocation. Thus, a d-partition, or
brieﬂy a partition, is a vector S = (S1, . . . , Sd), where S1, . . . , Sd are pairwise disjoint and their union is N. For a
particular partition S, the utility vector associated with S, is given by
V S = (V S11 , . . . , V S
d
d )
T ∈ Rd . (2.3)
Throughout, we impose a relaxing condition to which we refer to as the nondegeneracy assumption; it asserts that
vir/v
i
t = vjr /vjt for all distinct r, t ∈ D and distinct i, j ∈ N . (2.4)
The set of possible d-partitions will be denoted U , and the set of all possible utility vectors associated with the
partitions in U is denoted V , that is,
V = {V S | S ∈ U} ⊆ Rd . (2.5)
430 U.G. Rothblum, Y. Tangir / Discrete Applied Mathematics 156 (2008) 428–443
Finally, the convex hull of V is denoted W , that is,
W = conv(V ) ⊆ Rd , (2.6)
and we refer to W as the partition bargaining polytope.
We analyze the above model using the Nash bargaining game framework and the Nash solution. For that purpose, we
remind the reader that the Pareto-optimal surface of a convex set C ⊆ Rk , denoted P(C), is deﬁned by P(C) ≡ {c ∈
C : ¬∃ d ∈ C with d > c} (for two vectors u and v in Rd , u>v means u = v and uivi for each i). We recall that a
(normalized) Nash bargaining game is a triplet (D,U, V ·) with D and U as ﬁnite sets and with V · a function mapping
U into RD such that conv{V S : S ∈ U} contains a strictly positive point (with V S denoting the vector V · assigns
to S ∈ U ). Here, D, U and V · are, respectively, referred to as the set of players, the set of outcomes and the utility
function over outcomes, the latter assigns to each outcome S ∈ U the vector V S ∈ RD whose coordinates represent the
players’ utilities under outcome S. Given D, a solution for such bargaining games is a map (.) which assigns to each
bargaining game (D,U, V ·) a vector (D,U, V ·) inW ≡ conv{V S : S ∈ U}. Nash [7] proved that  satisfying certain
natural requirements must assign to each bargaining game (D,U, V ·) the (unique) maximizer of theproduct function
(x) =∏di=1xi over {x ∈ W : x0}; this map  is called the Nash solution.
Our approach is to consider partition bargaining problems described above as Nash bargaining games. We explore
properties of the corresponding Nash solutions and develop efﬁcient methods for their computation (to prescribed
accuracy).
3. Preliminaries: convex sets and pareto-optimal surfaces
In the current section, we summarize some standard facts about convex sets and Pareto-optimal surfaces used in our
development.
For two vectors, u and v in Rk , we write u?v if ui > vi for each i = 1, . . . , k, and we write uv if uivi for
each i = 1, . . . , k. Also, we write u>v if uv and u = v. A vector u ∈ Rk is called positive, semi-positive and
nonnegative if u?0, u> 0 and u0, respectively. The set of maximizers of a real-valued function f over a set C is
denoted arg maxx∈C f (x), or brieﬂy, arg maxC f . Given a vector  ∈ Rk , we denote by f the real-valued linear
function on Rk which maps each x in Rk into Tx.
We will refer to standard deﬁnitions concerning polytopes, see Ziegler [12] or Rockafellar [10]. In particular, a face
of a polytope C is the set of maximizers of a linear function over C. A vertex is a 0-dimensional face and an edge is a
1-dimensional face. In particular, a vertex is a face that contains a single element; as usual, if {v} is a vertex of C, we
also refer to v itself as a vertex of C. The set of vertices of C will be denotedE(C).We recall thatE(C) is the (uniquely
deﬁned) minimal set whose convex hull is C, that is, convE(C) = C and E(C) ⊆ B for every set B with convB = C.
The Pareto-optimal surface of a polytope C, denoted P(C), is the set of vectors u in C for which there is no vector v
in C with v >u; vectors in P(C) and subsets of P(C) are referred to as being Pareto-optimal for C or brieﬂy Pareto-
optimal. The next two lemmas state standard characterizations of Pareto-optimal points and Pareto-optimal faces of
polytopes.
Lemma 3.1. Let C be a polytope in Rk and let x be a vector in C. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) x ∈ P(C),
(b) x ∈ arg maxC f for some positive vector  in Rk , and
(c) if x has a representation x =∑qi=1ixi for some positive integer q, vectors x1, . . . , xq in C and positive scalars
1, . . . , q , then each xi is in P(C).
Lemma 3.2. Let C be a polytope in Rk . A subset F of C is a nonempty face of C that is contained in P(C) if and only
if F = arg maxC f for some positive vector  in Rk; in particular, in such cases, dim F k − 1.
Corollary 3.3. Let C be a polytope in Rk and x ∈ P(C). Then x is in some face F of C that is contained in P(C).
The next lemma records some further elementary facts.
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Lemma 3.4. Let C be a polytope in Rk and let F be a face of C. Then:
(a) E(F) = E(C) ∩ F , and
(b) if B ⊆ Rk has convB = C, then conv(B ∩ F) = F .
The CaratheodoryTheorem shows that when considering convex hulls of sets having dimension d it sufﬁces to restrict
attention to convex combinations of at most d + 1 elements. The next lemma modiﬁes this result to Pareto-optimal
points.
Lemma 3.5. Let B be a ﬁnite subset of Rk , C ≡ convB, d ≡ dimC and x ∈ P(C). Then there exists a face F of C
contained inP(C),apositive integerq min{d+1, k}and vectorsx1, . . . , xq inB∩F , such thatx ∈ conv{x1, . . . , xq}.
Proof. The (standard) Caratheodory Theorem assures that x is expressible as a convex combination of at most d + 1
vectors of B; further, as x ∈ P(C), Lemma 3.1 allows one to assume that these vectors are in P(C). It remains to
show that if k <d + 1, it sufﬁces to consider k vectors. But, as d = dim Ck, k <d + 1 implies k = d, that is, C
has full dimension. By Corollary 3.3, there exists a face F of C which is contained in P(C) and includes x; Lemma
3.2 assures that such F must have dim F <k. Also, from Lemma 3.4, conv(B ∩ F) = F . We next conclude from an
application of Caratheodory’s Theorem to F = conv(B ∩ F) that x ∈ F is expressible as a convex combination of at
most (dim F)+1k vectors of B ∩F , and once again, Lemma 3.1 allows us to assume that these vectors are in P(C).
Thus, we established the conclusion of the lemma when k <d + 1. 
4. Partitions associated with vectors in a common pareto-optimal face
The purpose of this section is to explore the similarity in item-assignment of partitions associated with vectors that
share a common Pareto-optimal face ofW . Speciﬁcally, we show that under such partitions the number of items that are
assigned in a nonuniformway is limited—thus, a lottery over partitions with utility vectors in a common Pareto-optimal
face assigns most items deterministically. Throughout, we apply notation introduced in Section 2.
Our ﬁrst result provides a sufﬁcient condition for a vector associated with a partition to be a maximizer over W of a
linear function.
Lemma 4.1. Let S be a d-partition and let  ∈ Rd . Then V S ∈ arg maxW f if and only if
Sr ⊆ {i ∈ N : rvirt vit } for all r, t ∈ D with r = t . (4.1)
Further, {V S} = arg maxW f if and only if (4.1) holds with the (weak) inequality “” replaced by (strict) inequality
“>”.
Proof. Suppose V S ∈ arg maxW f. For notational simplicity, assume that r = 1 and t = 2, the general case following
from symmetric arguments. Select an element i ∈ S1, and consider the partition S = (S1\{i}, S2 ∪ {i}, S3, . . . , Sd). It
then follows from the optimality of V S that
f(V
S)f(V S) = f(V S) − 1vi1 + 2vi2, (4.2)
implying that i ∈ {i ∈ N : 1vi12vi2}, and thereby verifying (4.1).
Next assume that S is a partition that satisﬁes (4.1) and we will show that V S ∈ arg maxW f. As W = convV , it
sufﬁces to show that f(V S)f(V S) for every partition S = S. So, let S = S be a partition and we will show that
f(V
S)f(V S).
For r, t ∈ D with r = t , let Qrt ≡ Sr ∩ St ; the items in Qrt are those assigned to r under S and to t under S. As the
two lists S1, . . . , Sd and S1, . . . , Sd are each pairwise disjoint, the Qrt ’s are pairwise disjoint when (r, t) ranges over
pairs in D × D with r = t . Next, let
Q ≡
d⋃
r,t=1
r =t
Qrt = N
∖
d⋃
r=1
(Sr ∩ Sr); (4.3)
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so, the items in Q are those that are assigned differently under S and under S. Of course, Q can be written as a list
i1, . . . , ip of distinct elements in N with p1. For each k = 1, . . . , p, we then have unique indices rk, tk such that
ik ∈ Qrktk .
We next construct recursively a series of partitions S = S1, S2, . . . , Sp, Sp+1 where for k = 1, . . . , p,
S
g
k+1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
S
rk
k \{ik} for g = rk,
S
tk
k ∪ {ik} for g = tk,
S
g
k for g ∈ {1, . . . , d}\{rk, tk};
(4.4)
as ik ∈ Srk , we then have from (4.1) that
f(V
Sk ) = f(V Sk ) − rk vikrk + tk viktk f(V Sk+1). (4.5)
Further, we observe that for g= 1, . . . , d, Sgp+1 = (Sg0 \{ik : k= 1, . . . , p, rk = g})∪ {ik : k= 1, . . . , p, tk = g}= Sg ,
implying that Sp+1 = S. Thus, we have that
f(V
S) = f(V S1)f(V S2) · · · f(V Sp+1) = f(V S). (4.6)
Finally, the characterization for {V S} = arg maxW f follows from the above arguments with the weak inequalities
“” replaced by strict inequalities “>” in (4.2), (4.5) and (4.6). 
Corollary 4.2. Let S be a d-partition with V S ∈ P(W). Then there exists a vector ?0 for which (4.1) is satisﬁed.
Proof. The claim is a direct conclusion of Lemmas 3.1 and 4.1. 
In order to formally state and prove the result asserting that Pareto-optimal partitions with associated vectors in a
common Pareto-optimal face yield “similar” item-assignments, we need some further deﬁnitions. For a face F ofW let
F ≡ {(i, r, t) ∈ N × D × D : r = t and some S, S ∈ U with (4.7)
V S, V S ∈ F have i ∈ Sr ∩ St },
I rtF ≡ {i ∈ N : (i, r, t) ∈ F } for r, t ∈ D with r = t (4.8)
and
IF ≡
d⋃
t=1
r =t
I rtF = {i : (i, r, t) ∈ F for some r, t ∈ D with r = t}. (4.9)
We observe that (i, r, t) ∈ F if and only if (i, t, r) ∈ F , implying that I rtF = I trF for r, t ∈ D with r = t , and
IF =⋃{I rtF : r, t ∈ D with r < t}.
Lemma 4.3. Let F be a face of W. Then each item in N\IF is assigned to the same player under all partitions S with
V S in F.
Proof. Suppose i ∈ N is assigned differently under partitions S and S with V S and V S in F, say i ∈ Sr and i ∈ St
where r, t ∈ D and r = t . Then i ∈ I rtF ⊆ IF . So, each item in N\IF must be assigned to the same player under all
partitions S with V S ∈ F . 
Theorem 4.4. Let F ⊆ P(W) be a face of W and let r, t ∈ D with r = t . Then∣∣I rtF ∣∣ 1; (4.10)
further, if I rtF = ∅, then |I rtF | = 1 and I rtF = arg maxi∈Sr vir/vit = arg maxi∈St vir/vit .
U.G. Rothblum, Y. Tangir / Discrete Applied Mathematics 156 (2008) 428–443 433
Proof. Lemma 3.2 assures that for some ?0, F = arg maxW f. By Lemma 4.1, for each partition S with V S ∈
F = arg maxW f,
i ∈ Sr ⇒ rvirt vit (4.11)
and
i ∈ St ⇒ t vit rvir . (4.12)
Now, suppose j ∈ I rtF , that is, (j, r, t) ∈ F . Let S and S be partitions with V S , V S in F and j ∈ Sr ∩ St . From
(4.11) to (4.12) (the latter applied to S), we conclude that rvjr = t vjt , or equivalently,
v
j
r /v
j
t = t /r . (4.13)
So, (4.13) must be satisﬁed by each item j ∈ I rtF . But, by the nondegeneracy assumption, there can be at most one item
j that satisﬁes (4.13); hence, there can be at most one item in I rtF , that is, |I rtF |1. Further, we have from (4.11) to (4.13)
that each j in I rtF must be in arg mini∈Sr vir/vit and in arg maxi∈St vir/vit , demonstrating that I rtF ⊆ arg mini∈Sr vir/vit
and I rtF ⊆ arg maxi∈St vir/vit .
It remains to show that if I rtF = ∅, then arg mini∈Sr vir/vit ⊆ I rtF and arg maxi∈St vir/vit ⊆ I rtF . So, assume that
I rtF = ∅ and let item j ′ be in either arg mini∈Sr vir/vit or in arg maxi∈St vir/vit . We will demonstrate that j ′ is in I rtF .
As we have already established (4.10), I rtF = ∅ implies that I rtF contains exactly one element, say j. Further, as we
have established that I rtF ⊆ arg mini∈Sr vir/vit and I rtF ⊆ arg maxi∈St vir/vit ,we have that j ∈ arg mini∈Sr vir/vit and
j ∈ arg maxi∈St vir/vit . It follows that vj
′
r /v
j ′
t = vjr /vjt and the nondegeneracy assumption assures that necessarily
j ′ = j ; in particular, j ′ ∈ I rtF . 
Theorem 4.4 shows that given a face F of W that is contained in P(W) and distinct players r and t, there are two
possibilities: either there exists a single item which is assigned to player r and player t under two distinct partitions
whose associated vectors are in F, or alternatively, there exists no pair of partitions with associated vectors in F and an
item which is assigned to player r under one partition and to player t under the other.
The conclusion of Theorem 4.4 need not hold without the assumption that F ⊆ P(W). For example, let F = {x ∈
W : x1 = 0} = argmaxWf for = (−1, 0, . . . , 0). When d3, F is a face of W which is not contained in P(W) and
IF = {1, . . . , n}.
Corollary 4.5. Let F be a face of W contained in P(W). Then |IF | |{(i, r, t) ∈ F : r < t}|( d2 ).
Proof. As (i, r, t) ∈ F if and only if (i, t, r) ∈ F , (4.9) implies that IF is the image of {(i, r, t) ∈ F : r < t}
under the projection (i, r, t) → i. The inequality |IF | |{(i, r, t) ∈ F : r < t}| is now immediate. Next, the inequality
|{(i, r, t) ∈ F : r < t}|( d2 ) is immediate from (4.10) (established in Theorem 4.4). 
Corollary 4.5 establishes a bound on |IF | for faces of W that are included in P(W). We will tighten this bound for
edges, while removing the assumption about inclusion in P(W). For that purpose we need some further notation and
auxiliary results. Let
 ≡ {(i, r, t) ∈ N × D × D : r = t}, (4.14)
and for each (i, r, t) ∈ , let girt ≡ −virer + vit et ∈ Rd , where e1, . . . , ed are the standard unit vectors in Rd (that is,
for k = 1, . . . , d, (ek)k = 1 and (ek)i = 0 for i = k). Of course, gitr = −girt for each (i, r, t) ∈ . Next, let
G ≡ {girt : (i, r, t) ∈ with r < t}. (4.15)
We next cast the nondegeneracy assumption in terms of G and the girt ’s.
Lemma 4.6. The nondegeneracy assumption is equivalent to the assertion that every pair of vectors in G are linearly
independent.
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Proof. The conclusion of the lemma is immediate from the observation that for triplets (i1, r1, t1) and (i2, r2, t2) in 
with r1 < t1 and r2 < t2, gi1r1t1 and g
i2
r2t2 are linearly dependent if and only if r1 = r2, t1 = t2 and vi1r1/vi2r2 = vi1t1 /vi2t2 . 
Recall that the tangential hull of a convex set C, denoted tng C, is given by {(x − y) :  ∈ Rand x, y ∈ C}. For
faces F of W , we next obtain a relationship between F and tng F.
Lemma 4.7. Let F be a face of W . Then {girt : (i, r, t) ∈ F } ⊆ (tngF)\{0}.
Proof. As F is a face of W , there is a vector  ∈ Rd such that F = arg maxW f; by Lemma 4.1, it then follows that
every partition S with V S ∈ F satisﬁes (4.1). Now, consider any pair of partitions S and S such that V S and V S are in
F. For each r, t ∈ D with r = t , let Qrt ≡ Sr ∩ St and let Q ⊆ N be deﬁned by (4.3) of the proof of Lemma 4.1, and
the elements of Q can be enumerated, say i1, . . . , ip. As in the proof of Lemma 4.1, for each k = 1, . . . , p, there exists
a unique pair of indices rk and tk with ik ∈ Qrk,tk . Also, partitions S1 = S, S2, . . . , Sp, Sp+1 = S can be recursively
constructed using (4.4), in particular, for k = 1, . . . , p, we have that
V Sk+1 = V Sk − vikrk erk + viktk etk = V Sk + girk,tk for k = 1, . . . , p. (4.16)
AsV S ∈ F , (4.1) can be used to verify (4.5) and (4.6) of the proof of Lemma 4.1. But, asV S is also inF =arg maxW f,
we have that f(V S) = f(V S) = maxW f, implying that equality must hold throughout (4.6) and (4.5). Thus, for
k=1, . . . , p, f(V Sk )=f(V S)=maxW f, implying that V Sk ∈ arg maxW f=F and girk,tk =V Sk+1 −V Sk ∈ tngF .
Now, if i ∈ Sr ∩ St , then i = ik for some k = 1, . . . , p, implying that r = rk , t = tk and girt = girk,tk ∈ tngF .
Now, assume that (i, r, t) ∈ F , that is, r, t ∈ D with r = t and there exist partitions S and S with V S, V S ∈ F and
i ∈ Sr ∩ St . It then follows from the above paragraph that girt ∈ tng F . Also, as vir and vit are positive, girt is nonzero.
Thus, the asserted inclusion has been established. 
Corollary 4.8. Suppose F is an edge of W and (i, r, t) ∈ F . Then girt spans tngF .
Proof. Lemma 4.7 assures that girt ∈ (tngF)\{0}; as dim (tngF) = 1, it follows immediately that girt spans
tngF . 
We are now ready to tighten the bound on |IF | for edges F of W .
Theorem 4.9. Suppose F is an edge of W . Then |IF | |{(i, r, t) ∈ F : r < t}| = 1.
Proof. The inequality |IF | |{(i, r, t) ∈ F : r < t}| follows from the arguments of the proof of Corollary 4.5. Also,
as F is an edge, |U⋂F |> 1 (Lemma 3.4), immediately implying that F = ∅ and that |{(i, r, t) ∈ F : r < t}|1.
Next assume that |{(i, r, t) ∈ F : r < t}|> 1 and we will derive a contradiction. Indeed, the assumption implies the
existence of distinct triplets (i1, r1, t1) and (i2, r2, t2) in F with r1 < t1 and r2 < t2. It then follows from Lemmas
4.6 to Lemma 4.7, respectively, that gr1t1i1 and g
r2t2
i2
are linearly independent and both are in tngF, a conclusion which
contradicts the assumption that F is an edge and dim(tngF) = 1. 
5. Decompositions of the Pareto-optimal surface via representing lotteries
In the current section, we derive two decompositions of the Pareto-optimal surface into the union of convex hull of
small sets of vectors.
We recall thatE(W) denotes the set of vertices ofW , in particular, convE(W)=W andE(W) ⊆ V . The main result
of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let x ∈ P(W). Then there exists a set I ⊆ N , a positive integer qd, partitions S1, . . . , Sq and a face
F of W such that:
(i) |I |( d2 ),
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(ii) F ⊆ P(W),
(iii) x ∈ conv{V S1 , . . . , V Sq },
(iv) V Sj ∈ F ∩ E(W) for j = 1, . . . , q, and
(v) each item inN\I is assigned to the same player under S1, . . . , Sq (that is, for each r=1, . . . , d, the sets Srj ∩(N\I )
are invariant of j).
Proof. Lemma 3.5, with B =E(W) ⊆ V and C = convE(W)=W , implies the existence of a face F of W , a positive
integer qd and partitions S1, . . . , Sq which satisfy (ii), (iii) and (iv). Now, let I ≡ IF . Corollary 4.5 then veriﬁes (i).
Finally, in view of (iv), Lemma 4.3 veriﬁes (v). 
Theorem 5.1 shows that each vector in P(W) is the expected utility of a lottery over partitions S1, . . . , Sq which
satisfy conditions (i)–(v) of Theorem 5.1. In particular, conditions (i) and (v) yield a bound on the number of items that
are not assigned deterministically under S1, . . . , Sq .
Corollary 5.2. Let
d∗ ≡ min{d, |P(W) ∩ E(W)|}. (5.1)
Then
P(W) ⊆
⋃
S1,...,Sd∗∈P(W)∩E(W)
conv{V S1 , . . . , V Sd∗ }. (5.2)
Proof. Let x ∈ P(W). Consider I, q, S1, . . . , Sq and F as in the conclusion of Theorem 5.1. From qd and property
(iv) in the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 we have qd∗; also, from properties (iii) to (iv) we have that x is in the set
deﬁned by the right-hand side of (5.2). 
Let b ≡ |P(W) ∩ E(W)| and let d∗ be deﬁned by (5.1). Corollary 5.2 implies that P(W) can be covered by ( b
d∗ )
convex hulls of sets where each consists of d∗ vectors. We next use Theorem 5.1 to derive a more compact cover of
P(W) than the one asserted in Corollary 5.2. To formally present it, we deﬁne for each partition S
MS ≡ {S ∈ U : S = Sand {V S, V S} ⊆ F ⊆ P(W) for some face Fof W }. (5.3)
Of course,MS =∅ if V S /∈P(W). Also, we have thatMS ∪ {V S}=∪{F ∩V : F ⊆ P(W) is a face ofW that contains
V S}. We next use the deﬁnition of MS and Theorem 5.1 to tighten the representation of the cover of P(W) given in
(5.2).
Corollary 5.3. Let d∗ be deﬁned by (5.1). Then:
P(W) ⊆
⋃
{S1:V S1∈P(W)∩E(W)}
⋃
S2,...,Sd∗∈MS1
conv{V S1 , V S2 , . . . , V Sd∗ }. (5.4)
Proof. The proof coincides with the proof of Corollary 5.2 after observing that property (iv) in the conclusion of
Theorem 5.1 assures that S2, . . . , Sd∗ ∈ MS1 . 
Again, let b ≡ |P(W) ∩E(W)|, let d∗ be deﬁned by (5.1) and let m= max{|MS | : S ∈ P(W) ∩E(W)}. Corollary
5.3 states a decomposition of P(W) as a union of at most b( m
d∗−1 ) convex hulls of sets where each consists of d
∗
vectors. Our next result bounds m, implying that the cover of P(W) in Corollary 5.3 is more efﬁcient than the one in
Corollary 5.2. A formal complexity analysis will be conducted in Section 8 where we develop explicit computational
methods for determining representations of these covers.
Theorem 5.4. Let S be a partition. Then |MS |2d(d−1).
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Proof. Throughout the proof we consider the partition S as ﬁxed. Let
J ≡ {(r, t) ∈ D × D : r = t and Sr = ∅}; (5.5)
of course, |J |d(d − 1). By the nondegeneracy assumption, for each (r, t) ∈ J , arg mini∈Sr vir/vit contains a single
element which we denote irt ; so,
{irt } = arg min{vir/vit : i ∈ Sr}. (5.6)
Also, for each partition S ∈ MS , let
K(S) ≡ {(r, t) ∈ D × D : r = tand Sr ∩ St = ∅} ⊆ J . (5.7)
Given S ∈ MS , there is a face F of W with {V S, V S} ⊆ F ⊆ P(W). We then have that
[(r, t) ∈ K(S)] ⇒ [I rtF ⊇ Sr ∩ St = ∅]
⇒ [|I rtF | = 1and I rtF = Sr ∩ St = arg min{vir/vit : i ∈ Sr} = {irtS }]. (5.8)
We conclude that for r ∈ D
Sr =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩Sr ∪
d⋃
t=1
r =t
[St ∩ Sr ]
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
∖⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
d⋃
t=1
r =t
[Sr ∩ St ]
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
= {Sr ∪ {itr : (t, r) ∈ K(S)}}\{irt : (r, t) ∈ K(S)} (5.9)
(the ﬁrst quality holding for every pair of partitions S and S and the second following from (5.8)). Thus,K(S) uniquely
determines S, implying that the map S ∈ MS → K(S) ⊆ J is one-to-one. We conclude that |MS | |2J |2d(d−1).

We note that the proof of Theorem 5.4 is constructive, and given a partition S, the argument of the proof can be used
to construct a set of partitions of size at most 2d(d−1) that containsMS . Speciﬁcally, given a partition S, let J S and irtS ’s
be deﬁned by the right-hand side of (5.5) and (5.6), respectively. For K ⊆ J S and r ∈ D let
T (K)r ≡ Sr ∪ {itrS : (t, r) ∈ K}\{irtS : (r, t) ∈ K}, (5.10)
and let T (K) ≡ {T (K)1, ..., T (K)d}. We observe that for some of these constructions T (K) is not a partition, or it
may be a partition which is not in MS . But, (5.9) shows that for each S in MS , T [K(S)] = S. Thus the set of partitions
among |T (K) : K ∈ J S | covers MS ; of course, it has at most d(d − 1) elements.
6. Enumerating Pareto-optimal partitions using separability
We refer to partitions whose associated utility vector V S is Pareto-optimal with respect to the partition bargaining
polytopeW as Pareto-optimal partitions. In this section, we enumerate a set of partitions, which we call separable; the
set of separable partitions is shown to contain all Pareto-optimal partitions. Further, we derive a polynomial bound on
the number of Pareto-optimal partitions and on the effort needed to generate them.
We introduce some further notation: For every two distinct players r, t we deﬁne an n-permutation vector rt whose
coordinates reﬂect the order of the ratios of the utilities of players 1 and 2, that is, rti is the i-ranked item when items
are ordered by vir/vit in decreasing order; in particular, if i < j then
v
rti
r /v
rti
t > v
rtj
r /v
rtj
t .
For example, if there are three items and two players with v11/v12 = 5, v21/v22 = 7 and v31/v32 = 1, then 12 = (2, 1, 3).
The nondegeneracy assumption assures that these vectors are well-deﬁned as no equality of two ratios is possible. We
note that tr is obtained from rt by reversing the order of the coordinates.
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We consider ( d2 )-dimensional integer vectors whose coordinates are indexed by pairs (r, t) with 1r < td and
each coordinate is in {0, 1, . . . , n}. Let H be the set of all such vectors. In particular, |H | = (n+ 1)( d2 ). The coordinates
of a vector h in H are then denoted h(r, t), and each such coordinate is in {0, . . . , n}. A partition S is called separable
if there exists a vector h in H such that for all 1r < td:
Sr ⊆ {rt1 , . . . , rth(r,t)}, (6.1)
and
St ⊆ {rth(r,t)+1, . . . , rtn }. (6.2)
In this case we say that h corresponds to S.
Lemma 6.1. Each Pareto-optimal partition is separable.
Proof. Let S be a Pareto-optimal partition. By Corollary 4.2 there exists a vector ?0 such that (4.1) is satisﬁed. It
then follows that for all r, t ∈ D with r < t , Sr ⊆ {i ∈ N : vir/vit t /r} and St ⊆ {i ∈ N : vit /virr/t }; in
particular,
[i ∈ Sr and j ∈ St ] ⇒ [vir/vit > vjr /vjt ]; (6.3)
(ties are impossible due to the nondegeneracy assumption). With h(r, t) ≡ max{i : rti ∈ Sr} we then have that (6.1)
and (6.2) are satisﬁed. 
We note that one can modify the proof of Lemma 6.1 and select h(r, t)=min{i−1 : rti ∈ St }, or any value between
max{i : rti ∈ Sr} and min{i − 1 : rti ∈ St }.
We next derive an explicit representation for separable partitions in terms of their associated vectors. Further notation
is needed for that purpose. For each vector h ∈ H , let
[T (h)]r ≡
⎛
⎜⎝ d⋂
t=1
t>r
{rt1 , . . . , rth(r,t)}
⎞
⎟⎠ ∩
⎛
⎜⎝ d⋂
t=1
t<r
{trh(t,r)+1, . . . , rtn }
⎞
⎟⎠ for r = 1, . . . , d. (6.4)
Also, let T (h) ≡ ([T (h)]1, . . . , [T (h)]d).
Lemma 6.2. For each h ∈ H , [T (h)]1, . . . , [T (h)]d are disjoint.
Proof. For 1r < td , [T (h)]r ⊆ {rt1 , . . . , rth(r,t)} and [T (h)]t ⊆ rth(r,t)+1, . . . , rtn }, immediately implying that
[T (h)]r ∩ [T (h)]t = ∅. 
Lemma 6.3. Let S be a separable partition with corresponding vector h in H. Then S = T (h).
Proof. Let r ∈ D. For t ∈ {r + 1, . . . , d}, (6.1) implies that Sr ⊆ {rt1 , . . . , rth(r,t)}. Also, for t ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, (6.2)
(with r and t reversed) implies that Sr ⊆ {trh(t,r)+1, . . . , trn }. So, Sr is included in each of the sets whose intersection
deﬁnes [T (h)]r (in (6.4)), implying that Sr ⊆ [T (h)]r .
We next verify the reverse inclusions, namely that [T (h)]r ⊆ Sr for each r ∈ D. Indeed, assume that i ∈ [T (h)]r
and we will show that i ∈ Sr . As S is a partition, i ∈ St for some t ∈ D, and the ﬁrst paragraph of our proof assures
that i ∈ [T (h)]t . So [T (h)]r ∩ [T (h)]t = ∅, and the disjointness of [T (h)]1, . . . , [T (h)]d (Lemma 6.2) implies that
r = t and thereby verifying that i ∈ Sr . 
Corollary 6.4. The number of separable partitions is bounded by (n + 1)( d2 ).
Proof. Lemma 6.3 implies that if a vector h ∈ H corresponds to two (separable) partitions, say S1 and S2, then
S1 = T (h) = S2. So, a vector in H can correspond to at most one separable partition, implying that |H | = (n + 1)( d2 )
bounds the number of separable partitions. 
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Note that not all vectors in H are associated with separable partitions, as the following example shows: Consider a
three-player, three-item gamewhere 12=(3, 2, 1), 13=(2, 1, 3) and 23=(2, 1, 3). Consider h ∈ H with h(1, 2)=1,
h(1, 3)= 2 and h(2, 3)= 1. Then T (h)= ({∅}, {2}, {3}), which is not a partition. It then follows from Lemma 6.3 that
h does not correspond to any separable partition.
Corollary 6.5. The number of Pareto-optimal partitions is bounded by (n + 1)( d2 ).
Proof. The conclusion is immediate from Lemma 6.1 and Corollary 6.4. 
Corollary 6.6. |P(W) ∩ V |(n + 1)( d2 ).
Proof. Each vertex ofW is associated with a partition, and a Pareto-optimal vertex is associated with a Pareto-optimal
partition. So, the conclusion is immediate from Corollary 6.5. 
Lemma 6.2 shows that T maps H into d-tuples of pairwise disjoint subsets of N = {1, . . . , n}. But, the example
following Corollary 6.4 demonstrates that the generated subsets need not form a partition (as their union need not be
N). The next lemma characterizes elements h in H for which T (h) is a separable partition.
Lemma 6.7. Let h ∈ H . Then the following are equivalent:
(a) T (h) is a separable partition of N,
(b) T (h) is a partition of N, and
(c) ∑dr=1|[T (h)]r | = n.
Proof. The implications (a) ⇒ (b) ⇒ (c) are trite. Finally, as the [T (h)]r ’s are disjoint (Lemma 6.2), (c) assures that
T (h) is a partition; as the deﬁnition of T by (6.4) assures that (6.1)–(6.2) are satisﬁed, T (h) is then a separable partition.
This proves that (c) implies (a) and completes our proof. 
Lemmas 6.3 and 6.7 motivate the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 (For enumerating separable partitions). The input for the algorithmconsists of ( d2 ) ranked lists of the inte-
gers {1, . . . , n} such that for every 1r < sd the corresponding list (i1, . . . , in) has vi1r /vi1s < vi2r /vi2s < · · ·<vinr /vins .
(a) For each h in H execute the following:
(i) Using (6.4) construct T (h).
(ii) If∑ds=1|T (h)s | = n, compute V T (h) and output (T (h), V T (h)); otherwise move to the next h.
Theorem 6.8. (a) The output of Algorithm 1 consists of all separable partitions, possibly with repetitions; its length is
bounded from above by (n + 1)( d2 ).
(b) The amount of effort required for executing Algorithm 1 is O[(n + 1)( d2 )+1] arithmetic operations and O[(n +
1)(
d
2 )+1] comparisons.
Proof. Part (a) is immediate from the implication (c)⇒ (a) of Lemma 6.7 and from the fact that |H |=(n+1)( d2 ).As for
part (b), observe the preprocessing the data requires that for each of the ( d2 ) pairs (r, t) satisfying r, t ∈ Dwith r < t , one
has to compute all the ratios vir/vit (requiring n divisions) and sort {vir/vit : i ∈ N} (requiring O[n log(n)] comparisons).
Next, consider any one of the (n + 1)( d2 ) iterations of the algorithm, say one corresponding to the element h in H.
For each pair (r, t) one has to separate {1, . . . , n} into two corresponding sets and apply (6.4). Given a pair (r, t) of
players and h(r, t), the corresponding separation is known to require O(n) comparisons. The generation of each [T (h)]r
(using(6.4)) requires the intersection of (d − 1) sets of size O(n); so, ( d2 )O(n) comparisons are required to generate
T (h). Also, step 2 of the algorithm requires d − 1 additions, and another n additions when V T (h) is to be computed.
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So, the total effort Algorithm 1 requires is bounded by ( d2 )O[n log(n)] + (n + 1)(
d
2 )[2( d2 )O(n)] = O[(n + 1)(
d
2 )+1]
comparisons and (n + 1)( d2 )[1 + (d − 1) + n] = O[(n + 1)( d2 )+1] arithmetic operations. 
Corollary 6.9. The output of Algorithm 1 contains all Pareto-optimal partitions.
Proof. This conclusion is immediate from Theorem 6.8 and Lemma 6.1. 
7. Enumerating extreme partitions using linear programming
In this section we apply multiple linear programs to generate the set of partitions whose associated vectors are the
vertices ofW ; we refer to such partitions as extreme partitions. The approach we use relies on a methodology developed
in Onn and Rothblum [8].
We need some further terminology.A direction of an edge of a polytopeP is a nonzero scalarmultiple of the difference
of two distinct vectors in that edge; we note that the directions of an edge are precisely the nonzero elements in its
tangential hull. Given a ﬁnite set 	 ⊆ Rd , we say that polytope P is 	-edge-guaranteed, if 	 contains a direction of
every edge of P.
We have the following lemma from Onn and Rothblum [8, Lemma 2.4].
Lemma 7.1. Let P ⊆ Rk be a polytope which is 	-edge-guaranteed and let 
 : Rk → Rk′ be a linear map which
maps P onto the polytope P ′ ⊆ Rk′ . Then P ′ is {
(e) : e ∈ 	}-edge-guaranteed.
For each partition S, let IS be the 0-1 n × d matrix with (IS)ir = 1 if i ∈ Sr and (IS)ir = 0 otherwise, and set
I ≡ {IS : S ∈ U} ⊆ {0, 1}n×d . Also, let  be the (linear) function which picks the diagonal of d × d matrices, that is,
 : Rd×d → Rd where for each B ∈ Rd×d , (B)r = Brr . With v1, . . . , vn deﬁned by (2.1), we observe that for every
partition S and r = 1, . . . , d,
{[(v1, . . . , vn)IS]}r =
∣∣∣(v1, . . . , vn)IS∣∣∣
rr
=
∑
i∈Sr
vir = (V S)r , (7.1)
demonstrating that [(v1, . . . , vn)IS] = V S .
We will identify sets of size n(d2 ), with respect to which conv I and W are, respectively, edge-guaranteed. For that
purpose, some further notation will be needed. Recall that e1, . . . , ed denote the standard unit vectors in Rd , that is,
for r = 1, . . . d, (er )r = 1 and (er )t = 0 for t = r . Similarly, let f 1, . . . , f n be the standard unit vectors in Rn. We
observe that for i ∈ N and r, t ∈ D, f i(er − et )T is the n × d matrix all of whose elements are 0 except for the (i, r)
element which is 1 and the (i, t) element which is −1. In particular, we deﬁne
	 ≡ {f i(er − et )T : i ∈ N and r, t ∈ D with r < t} ⊆ Rn×d ; (7.2)
as the elements in the set on the right-hand side of (7.2) are distinct, |	| = n(d2 ).
Theorem 7.2. (a) The set conv I is 	-edge-guaranteed.
(b) The set W is {[(v1, . . . , vn)g] : g ∈ 	}-edge- guaranteed.
Proof. The conclusion of (a) follows from Onn et al. [9, the ﬁnal paragraph of the Example in Section 3]. Still, we
include an independent proof which depends on the construction used in the proofs of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.7.
Let F be an edge of conv I. It then follows that there is a matrix B ∈ Rn×d such that F = arg maxconv I fB where
fB is the linear function on Rn×d with X ∈ Rn×d → ∑i∈N,j∈DXijBij . Consider a partition S′ with IS′ in F. For
(i, r, t) ∈ N ×D ×D with r = t and i ∈ (S′)r , let S′′ as the partition obtained from S′ by moving item i from agent r
to agent t; it then follows that fB(IS
′
)fB(IS
′′
) = fB(IS′) − Bir + Bit , implying that
−Bir + Bit0 for all (i, r, t) ∈ N × D × D with r = t and i ∈ (S′)r . (7.3)
Now, consider any pair of partitions S and S such that IS and IS are in F. For each r, t ∈ D, let Qrt ≡ Sr ∩ St and
let Q ⊆ N be deﬁned by (4.3) of the proof of Lemma 4.1. Further, enumerate the elements of Q, say by i1, . . . , ip.
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As in the proof of Lemma 4.1, for each k = 1, . . . , p, there exists unique distinct indices rk and tk with ik ∈ Qrk,tk .
Partitions S0 = S, S1, . . . , Sp, Sp+1 can now be recursively constructed using (4.4), in particular, for k = 1, . . . , p, we
have that ISk+1 = ISk − f ik (erk )T + f tk (etk )T, and therefore
fB(I
Sk+1) = fB(ISk ) − Bik,rk + Bik,tk0 for k = 1, . . . , p (7.4)
the last inequality following from (7.3) (with S′ = S, i = ik, r = rk and t = tk). So,
fB(I
S) = fB(IS1)fB(IS2) · · · fB(ISp )fB(ISp+1). (7.5)
Again as in the proof of Lemma 4.1, Sp+1 = S, implying that ISp+1 = IS ∈ F = arg maxconvI fB and fB(ISp+1) =
fB(I
S)=fB(IS). So, equality must hold throughout (7.5). In particular, for k= 1, . . . , p, ISk ∈ arg maxconv I fB =F
and ISk − ISk+1 = f ik (erk )T − f rk (etk )T ∈ 	 is a nonzero element in tng F, proving that 	 contains a direction of F.
Finally, for part (b), observe that W = conv{V S : S ∈ U} = conv{[(v1, . . . , vn)IS] : S ∈ U} = {[(v1, . . . , vn)x] :
x ∈ convI }. As the map x → [(v1, . . . , vn)x] is linear, Lemma 7.1 implies that W is {[(v1, . . . , vn)c] : c ∈ E}-
edge-guaranteed. 
Recall the deﬁnition of the girt ’s in Section 4. For each i ∈ N and r, t ∈ D with r < t , {(v1, . . . , vn)[f i(er −
et )T]} = {vi(er − et )T} = virer − vit et = −girt ∈ Rd . Thus,
{[(v1, . . . , vn)g] : g ∈ E} = {−girt : i ∈ N and r, t ∈ D with r < t} ⊆ Rd , (7.6)
providing an explicit representation for the set with respect to which W was shown (in Theorem 7.2) to be edge-
guaranteed. We note that the conclusion that W is edge-guaranteed with respect to this set follows immediately from
Corollary 4.8.
We will next apply the framework of Onn and Rothblum [8] to describe an efﬁcient algorithm for generating the
extreme partitions along with corresponding vertices of W . To apply this framework, we observe that the map of
partitions in U into corresponding n × d 0-1 matrices in I is one-to-one; thus, one can identify a partition S in U with
the location of the elements 1 in IS , that is, with {(i, r) ∈ N×D : (IS)ir =1}={(i, r) ∈ N×D : i ∈ Sr}. For each pair
(i, r) ∈ N ×D, let ir = virer ∈ Rd and consider the function  : Rn×d → Rd with (x)=
∑
(i,r)∈N×Dirxir ∈ Rd
for each x ∈ Rn×d . Using the above identiﬁcation of partitions with subsets of N ×D, we have that for each partition
S
(IS) =
∑
(i,r)∈S
ir =
∑
(i,r)∈S
vire
r =
∑
r∈D
er
(∑
i∈Sr
vir
)
= V S , (7.7)
implying that  maps I onto V . Also, for each i ∈ N and r, t ∈ D,
[f i(er − et )] =
∑
(i,r)∈S
ir − it = virer − vit et ; (7.8)
using (7.6), we see that (	) = {(g) : g ∈ 	} is the set with respect to which W = convV was shown (in Theorem
7.2) to be edge-guaranteed.
Finally, we recall that the zonotope determined by a ﬁnite set 	= {g1, . . . , gm} ⊆ Rd , denoted zone 	, is deﬁned
as the set
∑m
i=1[−gi, gi] = {
∑m
i=1igi : −1i1} = conv{
∑m
i=1igi : i ∈ {−1, 1}}.
The next lemma records known results about the number of vertices of a zonotope and about their computational
enumeration.
Lemma 7.3. The number of vertices of a zonotope in Rd that is determined by a set of size m is O(md−1); further, the
set of vertices of such a zonotope Z can be determined using O(md−1) arithmetic operations, with each vertex v of Z
listed along with a vector  ∈ Rd satisfying {v} = arg minZ f.
Proof. The stated bound on the number of vertices of a zonotope is classic, e.g., Buck [13]. As for a method for
enumerating the vertices of a zonotope along with vectors that deﬁne linear functions that are maximized at the
vertices, see Edelsbrunner et al. [2,3]. 
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Algorithm 2 (For enumerating extreme partitions). (a) Consider the zonotype Z ≡ zone (	) ⊆ Rd , and compute
a list (u1, . . . , uk) of all vertices of Z along with a list of d-vectors (1, . . . , k) such that for each s = 1, . . . , k,
{us} = arg maxZ fs .
(b) For each s = 1, . . . , k:
(i) Compute the n × d matrix Bs with (Bs)ir = rvir for each i ∈ N and r ∈ D.
(ii) Consider the linear function fBs over Rn×d which maps X ∈ Rn×d into ∑i∈N,j∈D XirBir , and determine a
partition Ss with {ISs } = arg maxI fBs .
(iii) Compute V Ss = (ISs ).
(iv) Output (Ss, V Ss ).
We next consider the output and computational complexity of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 7.4. (a) The size of the output of Algorithm 2 is O(nd−1).
(b) If (S1, V S1), . . . , (Sk, V Sk ) is the output of Algorithm 2, then V S1 , . . . , V Sk is the set of vertices of W , possibly
with repetitions.
(c) With d ﬁxed, Algorithm 2 can be executed with kO(nd−1) iterations, and with computational effort bounded
by O(nd) arithmetic operations and the solution of O(nd−1) linear programs over conv I .
Proof. As (	) ⊆ Rd and |(	)| |	| = n(d2 ), the ﬁrst statement of Lemma 7.3 implies that zone (	) has at most
O{[n(d2 )]d−1}=O(nd−1) vertices, establishing part (a) and the bound on the number of iterations ofAlgorithm 2 stated
in part (c). Next, for part (b), see the proof of Theorem 2.6 of Onn and Rothblum [8].
We next assess the computational effort associated with executing Algorithm 2. First, Lemma 7.3 shows that the
execution of step (a) can beaccomplished using at most O{[n(d2 )]d−1}=O(nd−1) arithmetic operations.As for step (b),
we note that each execution of step (b)-(i) requires nd multiplications, and each execution of step (b)-(iii) requires n
additions. Finally, each execution of step (b)-(ii) concerns a linear optimization problems over I—a standard approach
shows that this problem is equivalent to ﬁnding a vertex-solution of the corresponding linear programming problem
over conv I. So each iteration of step (b) requires the execution of O(n) arithmetic operations and the solution of a linear
programs over conv I. The stated bound on the effort of the Algorithm 2 now follows from the fact that the number of
times step (b) is executed is O(nd−1). 
Identifying partitions with correspondingmatrices in I, we refer to the optimization problems in Step (b)-(ii) as linear
combinatorial optimization problems (over I). We recall that efﬁcient (polynomial) algorithms for such problems,
see Ahuja et al. [1], for example. Further, the methods described in Onn and Rothblum [8, Section 2.3] facilitate
the simulation of an O[(nd)8] = O(n8) strongly polynomial algorithm for solving the above linear combinatorial
optimization problems.
8. Computing the Nash solution
The purpose of this section is to describe efﬁcient (that is polynomial in n) methods for computing the Nash solution
of the partition bargaining game described in Section 2, more speciﬁcally, to determine a lottery over partitions whose
associated expected utility vector maximizes the product function over the partition bargaining polytope. Our approach
is to use eitherCorollary 5.2 or 5.3 to coverP(W) by a union of convex hulls of d-subsets ofP(W)∩E(W) andmaximize
the product function over each of these convex hulls. Throughout this section we assume that |P(W)∩E(W)|d and
therefore the parameter d∗ deﬁned by (5.1) equals d.
Algorithms 1 and 2 of Sections 6 and 7 provide, respectively, efﬁcient methods for generating lists of separable and
of extremal partitions; in either case, the generated partitions come together with the associated expected utility vectors
which cover P(W) ∩ E(W). As Corollaries 5.2 and 5.3 focus on partitions S with V S in P(W) ∩ E(W), it seems
useful to ”thin” these lists correspondingly. Such thinning should be particularly useful for the ﬁrst list whose length
is bounded by (n+ 1)( d2 ), which is an order of magnitude larger than the bound O(nd−1) on the length the second list.
The next lemma presents a test for a partition to have its expected utility vector in P(W)∩E(W) and thereby facilitates
the aforementioned thinning operation.
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Theorem 8.1. Let S be a partition. Then V S ∈ P(W) ∩ E(W) if and only if there exists a vector  in Rd satisfying
r1 for each r ∈ D, and
rv
i
r − t vit 1 for each i ∈ Sr and t ∈ D\{r}. (8.1)
Proof. ByLemma3.2,V S ∈ P(W)∩E(W) if and only if there exists a vector?0 inRd such that {V S}=arg maxWf.
By Lemma 4.1, {V S} = arg maxWf is equivalent to the assertion that (4.1) holds with the (weak) inequality “”
replaced by (strict) inequality “>”, that is,
rv
i
r > t v
i
t for each r ∈ D, t ∈ D\{r} and i ∈ Sr . (8.2)
Using scalar scaling, the existence of ?0 inRd that satisﬁes (8.2) is equivalent to the existence of  inRd that satisﬁes
(8.1). 
We next describe a method for computing the Nash solution of partition bargaining games bymaximizing the product
function over convex hulls of sets of d vectors. Two variants are presented; they rely, respectively, on Corollaries 5.2
and 5.3.
Algorithm 3 (For computing the Nash solution). The input for the algorithm is a list (S1, V S1), . . . , (Sq, V Sq ), where
S1, . . . , Sq are partitions, V S1 , . . . , V Sq are, respectively, the associated utility vectors and {V S1 , . . . , V Sq } ⊇ P(W)∩
E(W).
(a) For each set {(Si1 , V Si1 ), . . . , (Sid , V Sid )} of d pairs from the input-list, solve the following nonlinear program
(NLP):
max
d∏
i=1
⎡
⎣ d∑
j=1
jV
Sij
⎤
⎦
i
s.t.
d∑
j=1
j = 1,
j 0 for each j ∈ D.
(8.3)
(b) Output the maximum of the optimal objective values of the nonlinear programs solved in (a) along with the d pairs
(Si1 , V
Si1 ), . . . , (Sid , V
Sid ) indexing the NLP at which the maximum is attained and the corresponding optimal
j ’s.
It follows from Corollary 5.2 that when the output of Algorithm 3 consists of (Si1 , V Si1 ), . . . , (Sid , V Sid ) and
1, . . . , d , then
∑d
j=1jV Sj maximizes the product function over the P(W), implying that the lottery under which
partition Sij is selected with probability j for each j = 1, . . . , d corresponds to a solution of the underlying partition
bargaining game.Of course, the solution of eachNLP to prescribed accuracywill result in a solution of themaximization
problem of the product function over P(W) to that accuracy.
Algorithms 1 and 2 of Sections 6 and 7 provide efﬁcient methods for generating the data for Algorithm 3 with
q = (n + 1)( d2 ) and q = O(nd−1), respectively. Further, Lemma 8.1 shows how the outputs of these algorithm can be
pre-processed to result shorter lists. Also, taking the logarithm of the objective function of NLP (in (8.3)) converts
that function into the function
∑d
i=1 lg[
∑d
j=1jV Sj ]i which is known to be concave in (1, . . . , d). So, each NLP
that is to be solved within step (a) of Algorithm 3 amounts to the maximization of a concave function with d variables
under variable-nonnegativity constraints and a single linear constraint. Standard methods are available for the efﬁcient
solution, to prescribed accuracy, of such problems. Of course, with input (S1, V S1), . . . , (Sq, V Sq ), the execution of
Algorithm 3 requires the solution of ( q
d
) NLP’s. In particular, the sizes of these problems is independent of n and
the effort of solving them to prescribed accuracy is independent of n and has no effect on the overall computational
complexity bound of the execution of Algorithm 3; the latter depends only on the effort that is required to pre-process
the input-data and on the size q of the input, as ( q
d
) NLP’s have to be solved .
We next consider the modiﬁcation of Algorithm 3 which relies on Corollary 5.3 rather than 5.3. The comments
following Algorithm 3 apply.
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Algorithm 4 (For computing the Nash solution). The input for the algorithm is a list (S1, V S1), . . . , (Sq, V Sq ), where
S1, . . . , Sq are partitions, V S1 , . . . , V Sq are the associated utility vectors and {V S1 , . . . , V Sq } ⊇ P(W) ∩ E(W).
(a1) For each set j =1, . . . , q, let i1 ≡ j and determine a list T of at most d(d−1) partitions which coversMSj =MSi1 .
(a2) Select d − 1 partitions, say Si2 , . . . , Sid from T, and solve NLP, as deﬁned by (8.3).
(b) Output the maximum of the optimal objective values of the nonlinear programs solved in (a), along with the d
pairs (Si1 , V Si1 ), . . . , (Sid , V
Sid ) indexing the NLP at which the maximum is attained and the optimal j ’s.
9. Extensions
Our results focused on the Nash solution of the partition bargaining games. But, much of our analysis concerned the
exploration of the Pareto-optimal surface of the polytope generated by the utility vectors associated with partitions. It
is therefore easy to extend our results to other solutions of bargaining games which assign to each bargaining game
(D,U, v) a point in P(W), where W is the convex hull of {V S : S ∈ U}, e.g., the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (see
[6]).
The next result shows that a standard perturbation technique allows one to impose the nondegeneracy assumption
when the original data does not satisfy it.
Lemma 9.1. For each r ∈ D, i ∈ N and > 0, let vir () ≡ vir (1+ )ir . Then the nondegeneracy assumption is satisﬁed
with the vir ’s replaced by the vir ()’s.
Proof. For each r, t ∈ D, i, j ∈ N and > 0, let
ijrt () ≡
vir ()
vit ()
/
v
j
r ()
v
j
t ()
=
[
vir
vit
/
v
j
r
v
j
t
]
(1 + )(i−j)(r−t). (9.1)
Trivially, for all sufﬁciently small positive , ijrt () = 1 whenever i = j and r = t ; for such , the nondegeneracy
assumption is satisﬁed. 
It is noted that all computational procedures developed under the nondegeneracy assumption can be executed uni-
formly for all sufﬁciently small positive , even without determining how small  has to be; for example, see Hwang et
al. [5]
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